The move is also another step toward a modernized personnel system that will improve fleet readiness and manning, officials said in the Navy administrative message announcing the program. Military leaders have stressed the need to update the sometimes-restrictive promotion system. Related : Gen. Here's What He Wants to Change.
Sailors interested in applying have to be active-duty E-5s who are in their detailing window for rotation and up-to-date on the most-recent E-6 Navy-wide advancement examination, according to the NavAdmin. They must also be qualified to fill the billets for which they're applying.
All sailors are allowed to apply for a sea duty A2P billet, but those on shore duty who are slated to rotate to sea duty can't apply for another shore-duty billet. If a sailor is selected to fill one of the new billets, they'll receive permanent change-of-station orders as they would for any other assignment.
Tour lengths will vary by rating and billet, Stillion said. Once they check into their new duty stations and complete all necessary training, they will be eligible for the E-6 pay grade, the NavAdmin states.
If sailors don't complete the necessary training, they will not advance to E-6 "regardless of whether or not they continue to execute orders to the ultimate duty station," the message adds.
Twenty-nine sailors participated in the pilot program to fill 30 advertised billets. Stillion said just one spot went unfilled due to a lack of qualified applications. Follow her on Twitter ginaaharkins. To combat such discrimination, the U. Navy has instituted formal job evaluations for its enlisted personnel [ 1 ]. In its promotion process, four of the five factors that determine promotion are reasonably objective performance measures.
Does this one subjective factor result in promotion rates that vary by race, ethnicity, or sex? If it fails, then the Navy needs new measures to prevent unequal treatment of minorities and women. The Navy believes that using objective standards is vital to preventing discrimination and unequal treatment in promotions. Minorities and males constitute a larger share of the Navy than of the civilian population.
Fig 1 shows the relative frequencies of minorities in the United States population census and in the Navy at the end of the period we study The proportions of Blacks in all Navy paygrades are much higher than their overall population proportion. The proportions of Hispanics are similar or lower than Whites except for paygrade E1-E3. The proportions of females are much lower than that of males in all paygrades.
The Navy has worked hard to increase its retention rates to maintain national security. To investigate whether promotion and retention rates vary by race, ethnicity, and gender, we present the first consistently estimated promotion and retention model. Virtually all previous studies of military and civilian labor forces look at only one or the other of these decisions, look at the two decisions separately, or do not consistently estimate these sequential decisions.
We use a two-step decision model. Second, sailors decide whether to remain in the Navy or leave, conditional on whether they receive a promotion and other Navy decisions such as whether they are assigned sea duty. Our analysis uses data covering the universe of Navy enlisted personnel from January through May Two of the earliest and best-known promotion studies are [ 4 , 5 ].
The authors investigated the relationship between personal attributes and job performance as measured by the rate of promotion. The basic model is a degenerate most states are zero first-order Markov transition model.
The firm decides whether to promote, and the individual decides whether to stay or leave, but these decisions are not estimated separately. The transition probability is estimated independently of the grade level rank using a maximum likelihood method. Other methods used to study promotions include ordered multinomial models [ 6 ], multinomial systems of censored equations [ 7 ], random-effects models [ 8 ], and Markov promotion models [ 9 ]. There are surprisingly few recent papers on promotion and retention in civilian labor markets.
The few that exist do not simultaneously examine promotion and retention, such as the study of baseball by [ 10 ]. Our superior data allow us to use a methodology that differs from previous studies in two critical ways. We measure their options using their expected wage and employment probability conditional on their skills, demographics, and the state of the economy. Most previous studies, particularly Navy studies, examine only whether an individual was both promoted and stayed with the firm.
Those few studies that address promotion and retention separately do not formally analyze the link between these decisions. While many articles have been written on wage and other forms of discrimination [ 12 , 13 ], relatively few articles address the role of discrimination in promotion and retention, particularly in the Navy.
Several analyses—most of which are primarily descriptive—concluded that promotion rates in the Navy and other armed forces vary by race or gender. These studies examined the combined outcome that one is promoted and stayed in the armed force.
For example, [ 14 , 15 ] showed that such promotion rates differ by race in the U. In the probit model in [ 17 ], a variable is one if a Marine Corps officer is promoted and remains in the Corps. Other studies such as [ 18 , 19 ] looked at retention in the military but did not examine the promotion decision. Some Center for Naval Analyses studies [ 20 — 22 ] examined various aspects of officer career progressions. A few studies addressed, at least descriptively, both promotion and retention.
A gender differences in promotion and retention rates in the U. Air Force was found in [ 23 ]. One study [ 24 ] observed a link between the rate of promotion and retention of enlisted personnel. Another study [ 25 ] looked at civil service workers in the Department of Defense. It estimated separate promotion and separation regressions using survival analysis Cox proportional-hazard model.
The study that is most similar to our work is [ 26 ]. It examined the relationship between recruit quality and promotion speed of the U. The first stage models the time until promotion which implicitly assumes that the sailor remains within the Navy.
The second stage is a probit model for the probability of attrition that includes the predicted hazard rate of promotion. Consequently, even if these estimates were consistent, they would not allow one to determine how the promotion rate affects the probability that a sailor remains in the Navy, unlike in our study.
The Navy imposes many requirements on its promotion process. One of its chief motivations for its formal process is to prevent discrimination. Enlisted sailors are assigned to pay grades E1 through E9. A sailor must spend a minimum time in any given grade before promotion is possible, with few exceptions. After sailors have spent the minimal period in a grade and demonstrated a minimal level of performance, their probability of promotion is positive until they have spent the maximum permitted time in that grade without a promotion and must leave the Navy.
Sailors start in pay grade E1 and receive virtually automatic promotions to E2 and then E3. Promotions to higher ranks are not guaranteed. The promotions we examine, from E4 through E6, are based on primarily objective performance evaluations. Our model also captures demotions: moving to a lower pay grade. We do not discuss demotions because the data contain only a handful of such cases. Promotion to E7 adds a record review by a selection board. A selection board decides whether to promote someone to E8 or E9 based on several factors, some of which are highly subjective.
Consequently, we concentrate on promotions to E4 through E7, where fewer factors are subjective. The Navy promotes sailors, within skill groups and specialties, to the next pay grade starting with the highest individual Final Multiple score until it fills all its vacancies in that pay grade.
Most of the aspects of this process are objective and leave no room for discrimination. The first component of the Final Multiple score for ranks E4 through E6 is time in service in a pay grade. Individuals cannot take the required pre-promotion exam until they meet the minimum time in grade TIR , which varies by pay grade.
A supervisor evaluates an individual on teamwork, leadership, and other factors. Each sailor is assigned a PMA four-point scale score. An individual must receive a PMA greater than or equal to 3.
The Navy has tried to force performance mark averages into a bell curve across all individuals with limited success. If discrimination or other non-objective criteria enter the Final Multiple score, they enter through the PMA. The third component is the pre-promotion examination score. All eligible individuals must take the exam.
In each promotion cycle approximately every six months depending on the pay grade , the Navy sets a cut score: the minimum exam score for an individual to be eligible for a promotion. An individual who fails to pass must take another exam in the next promotion cycle. In our empirical work, we use a variable called Pass, which is one if the sailor takes and passes this test and the Final Multiple exceeds the cut score.
Individuals who did not receive a promotion the first time they were eligible because of a lack of vacant positions are awarded PNA points. The fifth component is Awards. There are 28 different awards listed for which points can be earned, with points varying across these awards. For example, a sailor receives 10 points for the Medal of Honor, 5 points for the Navy Cross, and 2 points for an Executive Letter of Commendation.
Such major awards are extremely uncommon. Thus, the Final Multiple is a function of four objective measures and one subjective measure, the PMA. Some subjectivity may also enter into decisions to promote a few people outside of this system—early promotion—or decide which sailor among several with the same Final Multiple score receives a promotion. Finally, promotion from E6 to E7 involves one more stage that introduces subjectivity. An advancement board similar to the promotion boards for officers considers all candidates with adequate final multiples.
The panel of raters compares candidates against each other. The panel uses an iterative process to reach some pre-established number of advancements. Regardless of whether they receive a promotion, sailors must decide whether to re-enlist for an additional period toward the end of their current contract. Most sailors who re-enlist do so for four years, though they may also be able to re-enlist for five or six years. Under certain circumstances, sailors can extend their service for up to two years [ 27 , 28 ].
All sailors are subject to the High Tenure Policy, which sets a maximum time by which an individual must receive a promotion to the next pay grade from the current one. However, we did not observe any cases that used the High Tenure Policy. Individuals unlikely to get a promotion receive a signal and leave well before they hit their maximum time limit. Consistent with this observation, we did not observe changes in average tenures when the rules on High Tenure changed.
The Navy data set covers all enlisted sailors in every skill group occupation and pay grade E3 through E7 from January through May We drop one-seventh of the observations due to missing data for some variables, which does not change the moments of the original data set. Thus, the missing values are random. We start following sailors in the month when they first received a promotion from January through May We then record information about that individual for each successive month period.
We experimented with shorter and longer periods and found that our results are insensitive to the length of this interval. We follow sailors until they exit the sample, or we reach the final period.
We have no natural birth cohort or period cohort. However, we observe a promotion cohort: people eligible for promotion at each promotion cycle at each pay grade and occupation. We consider all completed promotion decisions within our time frame, dropping the remaining data at the end of our sample period.
Consequently, the data set may be truncated from the left—if the first promotion occurred in a year before the first time we observe an individual in the data—or from the right—if the last observed promotion occurred after the last period, May Using this approach, we can measure the length of time from the last promotion to a given promotion decision.
The S1 Appendix provide a complete description of our data. In some cases, the sailor is already in the middle of an enlistment period, so they cannot leave immediately, but we know if they left in the following period. Let y i 1 be a binary variable that equals one if the Navy promotes an individual and zero otherwise , and y i 2 is a binary variable that equals one if the sailor remains in the Navy following the promotion decision.
Thus, where z i 1 is the latent variable related to whether the Navy promotes the individual, and z i 2 is the latent variable for reenlistment. Given the large sample size, the normality assumption is reasonable. The ML estimator accounts for the endogeneity of y i 1 in the second equation. In a linear system, one uses instrumental variables to address endogeneity. The two equations contain some common demographic variables.
This criterion rose to 35 in July We use White as the base group, as it is the largest group. We interact the pay grade dummies with the race-ethnicity and female dummies to test for demographic group differences in promotion and retention across the pay grades. Our data period is nearly evenly divided into peacetime before September 11, , and wartime afterward.
We use five time variables. The Peacetime variable is a time trend that increases by one each year through September , and then is zero. Wartime is a time trend that is zero before September and then increases by one each year. We also include squared terms for both these time trends. The trend variables capture changes in the ratio of the civilian wage to the Navy wage.
The remaining variables appear in only one of the equations. The variables that are only in the promotion equation are the Navy policies we discussed earlier. These variables serve as instruments for the retention equation.
Although we know of no reason why these interaction variables should appear in the retention equation, we experimented with including them. However, all of their t-statistics were virtually zero. The military designed the AFQT to be an unbiased test across demographic groups [ 33 ]. However, because it tests school-taught mathematical and verbal skills, if some demographic groups receive inferior educations, their AFQT scores could be systematically lower than those of other groups.
To capture any such effect, we interact the AFQT score with the demographic group dummies. The Pass dummy shows whether an individual was eligible to take the exam and passed it.
It is not a perfect indicator because the Navy occasionally promotes people who have not taken or passed the exam if the Navy has an extraordinary need for personnel in certain positions.
The Navy chooses whether to promote all eligible sailors depending on demand and supply conditions. Takers is the number of sailors who are potentially eligible for promotion, at the same period, pay grade, skill, and specialty, and have taken and passed the exam. Most of the variables in only the retention equation measure family and economic conditions in the civilian labor and housing markets. We expect married sailors to be more likely to remain in the Navy than those who are single.
We include the interaction of married and current sea duty. Because a sailor on sea duty receives bonus pay and may or may not prefer being at sea, the sign of this interaction is ambiguous. How long a sailor has been in the Navy affects reenlistments because a sailor receives a full pension after 20 years of service. Thus, these dummies and the interactions allow the length of service to vary in the different zones.
A sailor who is close to having served 20 years, Zone D, is unlikely to leave. To prevent sailors with relatively little time in the Navy from leaving, the Navy sometimes provides a retention bonus to sailors in Zone A in a job that the Navy has difficulty filling. The Navy may provide a smaller bonus for someone in Zone B, but it rarely provides a bonus for sailors in Zone C and does not provide a bonus for more senior sailors.
Time in rank affects whether a sailor stays in the Navy. A sailor who does not receive a quick promotion may choose to leave before hitting the maximum time when the sailor must leave if not promoted. Because the Pass dummy captures whether a sailor has enough time in rank to be eligible for a promotion, we do not include time in rank in the promotion equation.
Pay grade and seniority determine the base pay. The only way a sailor can receive a higher base pay is through promotion. Presumably, sailors compare this base pay to what they think they could earn in the civilian market. To capture general conditions in the civilian labor and housing markets, we added two macro variables lagged one period: The Gross Domestic Product [ 34 ] and the unemployment rate [ 35 ].
Initially, we included many more macroeconomic variables, such as the NASDAQ closing index and the mortgage rate, but we found that they had virtually no additional explanatory power.
We estimated an employment-unemployment ML probit equation for the civilian labor market that includes individual characteristics corresponding to those in the Navy data. In the probit, we weighted the data to reflect the over-sampling of veterans in the CPS data. The marks are then averaged, resulting in a Performance Mark Average PMA , which is then converted to promotion points as follows:.
The maximum possible performance evaluation points for promotion to E-4 and E-5 are 64, which means the points comprise 36 percent of the total possible promotion points.
The maximum possible performance evaluation points for promotion to E-6 are , which means evaluations count as 50 percent of the maximum possible score.
The maximum possible performance evaluation points for promotions to E-7 are , which means this portion comprises 60 percent of the maximum possible points. For example, if a sailor has 3 years, 6 months TIG, that would be 3. TIR Points are not used for E-7 promotions. Awards, Medals, and Decorations - Certain military awards, medals, and decorations are awarded a designated number of promotion points.
Award, Medal, and Decoration points are not used for E-7 promotion point computation. Passed, Not Advanced PNA Points - If a sailor was considered for promotion in the past five years, had high promotion scores, and high-performance ratings, but was not promoted because of a shortage of promotion vacancies, they get a "boost" in their promotion chances by the award of PNA Points.
Only factors promotion test scores and performance ratings in the previous five promotion cycles can be used. PNA Points are computed in fractions of one-half point to a maximum of 1. FMS results for all candidates are rank-ordered from the top to the bottom score - or from the most qualified to the least qualified.
For example, there are candidates for BM3 who meet all eligibility criteria for a given advancement cycle. However, there are only vacancies to be filled. The rank-ordering process identifies the top based on FMS who will actually be advanced. Chief Petty Officer E-7 Promotions. The advancement exam is just the first step for those under consideration for promotion to E-7, Chief Petty Officer. Within each rating, those in the top 60 percent based on the above promotion points are considered for promotion by a service-wide promotion board.
Each selection board consists of a captain O-6 who serves as president, a junior officer from BUPERS advancement section, who serves as a recorder, and officers and master chief petty officers who serve as board members.
Additionally, a sufficient number of assistant recorders ensure the smooth handling of records. The exact size of a board varies, but each board usually consists of about 78 members.
The board meets in Washington, D. The enlisted members are usually from out of town. The recorder, assistant recorders, officer of the Chief of Naval Personnel CNP enlisted advancement planner and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy may consult with the entire board on any matter concerning selections.
With the board president's concurrence, the recorder divides the board members into panels, which are responsible for reviewing the records of individuals in one general professional area, i. Each panel consists of at least one officer and one master chief. This quota is filled by the "best-qualified" candidates. Quotas may not be exceeded but may remain unfilled if the panel determines there is an insufficient number of best-qualified candidates in a rating.
In some cases, commanders have the authority to bypass the normal promotion system and promote sailors early. So, how long does it take to get promoted in the Navy? On average , one can expect to be promoted after completing the following Time-in-Service Statistics :. The NEAS website is available for educational services officers to verify and correct the list of eligible candidates for their command, and confirm examination ordering information.
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